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These briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task 
Force on the Intergovernmental Conference. Their purpose is to gather 
together, in an organized, summary form, the proposals and suggestions 
which the authorities in the Member States, the Union's institutions and 
specialist commentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on 
the IGC 96 agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 Codecision procedure 
9 CJHA 
10 European citizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 Public services 
13 Social policy 
14 The European Parliament 
15 The European Council 
16 The Council of the European Union 








ON THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Contents 
SUMMARY 
AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE 
POSITIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES: 
1. BELGIUM . • . 
2. DENMARK 
3. GERMANY 
4. GREECE • 
5. SPAIN 
6. FRANCE • 
7. IRELAND 
8. ITALY .•• 
9. LUXEMBOURG 
1 0. NETHERLANDS 
11. AUSTRIA 
12. PORTUGAL ••.••• 
13. FINLAND .••.••. 
14. SWEDEN . • 
15. UNITED KINGDOM •• 
POSITION OF THE COMMISSION • . 
POSITION OF THE COUNCIL 
POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 






















7. OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES 
7. 1 . THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 25 
7. 2. THE COURT OF AUDITORS . . . . • . • . 26 
7. 3. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE . . . . . . 26 
7.4. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 26 
8. OTHER POSITIONS 
* PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE REFLECTION GROUP 
ON THE 1996 IGC (1 SEPTEMBRE 1996) . . . . . . . . 27 
DOC_EN\DV\280\280115 - 4 - Or. ES 
JF/bo 
1. SUMMARY 
It appears that the main subjects related to the Council of the European Union 
likely to be discussed at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be: 
* the decision-making procedure, especially with respect to the voting system 
and the weighting arrangements; 
* the organization of the work of the Council: its presidency, composition and 
secretariat. 
In the context of these subjects and the documents and opinions already 
submitted, the overall situation at present appears to be as follows: 
on the voting system, a gradual consensus seems to be emerging that unanimous 
voting must be replaced by qualified majority voting. Some wish to extend 
qualified majority voting to the CFSP, and even to cooperation in justice and 
home affairs. However, many Member States take the view that on a number of 
subjects (including second and third pillar decisions, cultural matters, 
taxation, own resources, the language regime, new accessions, revisions of the 
Treaties, European citizenship, finance, social security and welfare in general) 
unanimous voting should be retained, or else replaced by an 'extended qualified 
majority' arrangement; 
on the blocking majority/minority, the incipient consensus seems to be 
against retaining the Ioannina compromise, whether in its existing form or in 
a slightly amended version; 
on reforming the weighting arrangements, the large Member States are 
unequivocally in favour of changing them to obtain a closer match between Member 
States' population and weight in Council. Various types of double weighting 
(votes/population or votes/number of Member States) are proposed to this end. 
However, the smaller Member States are in general opposed to any such change; 
on the leadershio and coordination of the Council and its presidency, there 
is a broad consensus that the presidency should be strengthened. The formulas 
proposed include: a longer term for the presidency; creating 'presidential 
teams'; a 'troika'-type presidency, to consist of one large Member State and two 
medium-sized or small Member States and serve for a minimum period; an 
'elective' presidency, to serve for at least one year; and a presidency which 
would represent the Union to the outside world over a period of several years, 
with the presidential role being filled by a 'personality', assisted by the 
President-in-Office of the Council and the Commission President as vice-
presidents. 
2. AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE 
As far as the reform of the Council is concerned, the agenda for the conference 
for the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht is essentially predetermined by the 
various legal and political documents and other sources relating to the IGC: 
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1. The Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 189b(8), which provides 
for the review of the codecision procedure involving Parliament and the Council. 
In addition, Articles J. 4 and J. 1 0 provide for the review of the CFSP 
provisions. 
2. The Brussels European Council of 1 0 and 11 December 1993 
In line with the conclusions of the Brussels European Council, the IGC agenda 
will include the weighting of the Member States 1 votes in Council. The 
conference will also consider what measures may be required to facilitate the 
work of the institutions and ensure their smooth running. 
3. The European Council of 29 March 1994 and the Ioannina Compromise 
With the accession of Austria and Sweden (with four votes each in Council) and 
Finland (with three), the total number of votes in Council is now 87, and the 
number of votes required for a qualified majority is 62 (there is a further 
requirement that at least 10 Member States should have voted in favour where the 
Council is not in agreement with the Commission proposal) . The Ioannina 
Compromise, in its present form following the fourth enlargement, lays down that 
where members of the Council who together represent 23 to 25 votes state their 
intention of opposing adoption of a Council decision by a qualified majority, 
the Council will do all in its power to obtain a satisfactory solution; this is 
to be adopted with at least 65 votes in favour, within a reasonable period of 
time and without prejudice to the mandatory time limits specified by the 
Treaties and derived law. The Ioannina Compromise also includes an agreement by 
the Member States that the 1996 IGC will consider the reform of the institutions 
and re-examine the minimum number of votes required for a qualified majority. 
4. The Corfu European Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 
The Corfu European Council confirmed the Ioannina Compromise and agreed to the 
setting up of a 1 Reflection Group 1 to prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference. The Group will have the tasks of: examining the provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union which needed to be revised and proposing possible 
changes; and preparing options on the institutional questions referred to in the 
conclusions of the Brussels European Council and the Ioannina Compromise (number 
of votes, qualified majority ceiling, size of the Commission, and other measures 
to ensure the smooth running of the institutions in the context of enlargement) . 
5. The Cannes European Council of 26 and 27 June 1995 
The Cannes European Council stated that the priorities of the Reflection Group 
should include discussion of improving the efficiency, democratic character and 
transparency of the institutions, to enable them to adapt to the needs of a 
larger Union. The Group would also be asked to examine means of improving the 
workings of the institutions which would not require amendment of the Treaties 
and could, therefore, be implemented immediately. 
6. Interinstitutional agreements. These include: 
6. 1 • The interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency and 
subsidiarity of 25 October 1993; 
6.2. The interinstitutional agreement of 29 October 1993 on budgetary 
discipline and reform of the budget procedure; 
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6. 3. The 1 modus vi vendi 1 concerning commi to logy reached by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 20 December 1994. 
* * * 
Finally, it should be noted that the Essen European Council (9 and 10 December 
1994) agreed that the IGC should be held before the accession negotiations with 
the countries of central and eastern Europe, to ensure the existence of the 
institutional conditions required for the Union to function correctly. 
3. POSITIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
maGi me 
· .. ·.:::':' ·· .. · .. :;, . 
The Belgian Government has thus far issued no official document concerning the 
1996 IGC. 
On 11 January 1995, in an address delivered to the Royal Institute of 
International Relations in Brussels, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Mr Frank Vandenbroucke, opposed both the right of veto and any compulsory or 
systematic use of unanimous voting at Union level. 
On the same day as Mr Vandenbroucke's speech, the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr 
Dehaene, gave an address to the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in which 
he made it clear that Belgium wishes to preserve the institutional balance and 
is open to any suggestions concerning the weighting of votes in Council. 
In a further speech, given on 23 March 1995 at the College of Europe in Bruges, 
Mr Dehaene spoke in favour of majority voting in Council in the areas of social 
policy, taxation and the environment, while on 10 July 1995 King Albert II said 
in Germany that majority voting should become the general rule in the decision-
making process. 
At approximately the same time, Mr Dehaene said in an interview that it could 
be acceptable to reduce the weight of the smaller Member States within a more 
integrated Union, provided suitable safeguards were introduced to protect their 
interests. 
The Danish Government has not as yet issued any official document setting out 
its views on the 1996 IGC. 
As far as institutional reforms are concerned, there is general support in the 
Danish parties for introducing qualified majority voting in Council into a large 
number of new areas, so as to prevent the Union being weakened by repeated 
enlargement. 
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With respect to the balance between small and large Member States, there appears 
to be a consensus among the Danish parties to the effect that there should be 
no change in the arrangements for weighted voting in Council and that a 'double 
majority' system should be introduced to ensure that institutional decisions are 
not made by a majority of Member States corresponding to a minority of the total 
population. It is felt that each Member State should have one commissioner and 
that the Council presidency should be held by each Member State in turn, with, 
possibly, a reinforcement of the Community 'troika'. 
The Danish Conservatives believe that the Council should have a formal right of 
initiative similar to that already enjoyed by the Commission. 
G!iUWt! 
:,;, .... :::··: ...... ; .. :;;,·:·· 
I. Basic positions of the Federal Government with regard to the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
On 21 February 1995, the German Foreign Minister, Mr Klaus Kinkel, set out the 
underlying philosophy behind the Federal Government's priorities for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. Among other points, he stressed that the notion 
of deciding by majority vote on foreign policy matters should no longer be 
taboo, and that the weighting of the votes of the Member States must be part of 
the IGC agenda item on 'increasing efficiency'. Earlier, on 20 February 1995, 
Mr Kinkel had called for the Union to move speedily towards majority voting in 
Council in all respects. 
II. Basic positions of the German Lander 
The conclusions of the Conference of Ministers of European Affairs of the Lander 
held on 16 February 1995 state expressly that majority voting in Council should 
become the rule and that the existing qualified majority voting regime should 
be replaced by a 'dual majority' arrangement whereby decisions would be adopted 
if supported by a majority of the Member States represented in Council and a 
majority of the total population corresponding to those Member States. 
On 24 June 1995, the Ministers of European Affairs of the sixteen Lander, 
meeting in Wiirzburg, adopted a text on the IGC advocating greater use of 
majority voting in Council (with the introduction of a population criterion). 
III. Basic positions of the parties and of the Groups in the Bundestag 
Among the various positions adopted by the German political parties in relation 
to the IGC, one may note the proposals of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag, 
in the light of its role as the political and parliamentary base of the Kohl 
government. 
The manifesto of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag ( 1 September 1994) 
With regard to the development of the institutions, the document proposes that 
one objective should be the reform of all the existing institutions with a view 
to achieving a new institutional balance, under which: Parliament would become 
the Union's basic legislative body, with equal rights to the Council; the 
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Council would, in addition to its intergovernmental responsibilities, take on 
the role of a second chamber (probably a 'chamber of the Member States'); and 
the Commission would become a fully-fledged European government. 
The CDU/CSU discussion dOCUDlent 'Strengthening the power of action of the 
European Union in the field of the common foreign and security policy', 13 June 
1995 
With respect to reforming the decision-making process, this document reaffirms 
the following two objectives: 
Foreign policy and security objectives which do not have military 
implications should be dealt with by qualified majority vote, with the 
introduction of a 'dual majority' arrangement whereby decisions would be adopted 
if supported by a majority of the Member States represented in Council and a 
majority of the total population corresponding to those Member States. 
Decisions on foreign policy and security matters having military implications 
and, in particular, entailing recourse to military action, should be taken in 
such a way that a minority of Member States is not able to prevent the majority 
from committing itself to a joint action, while, equally, no Member State is 
obliged to take part in joint actions against its will. This would mean that 
joint actions could be undertaken by a restricted number of Member States under 
the aegis of the Council; those Member States which did not take part would, 
however, be expected to express their solidarity by contributing to the joint 
funding of those actions. 
On organizational and institutional matters, the document proposes the 
following: 
that there should be a suitable permanent body (not specifically defined) 
with the responsibility of analyzing, planning, proposing and monitoring the 
execution of Council decisions under the CFSP; 
that every effort should be made, while not undermining the Union's 
institutional balance, to unite the existing capacities of the Commission, the 
Council, the WEU and all the Member States so as to submit, at the appropriate 
moment, suitable proposals to the Council, in agreement with the Commission, 
with a view to implementing the CFSP and ensuring that the relevant provisions 
of the Council are applied. 
The CDU/CSU discussion dOCUDlent 'Developing the constitutional state at European 
level', 13 June 1995 
The second section of this text is concerned with the extension of the rules of 
the constitutional state at European level. As far as institutional implications 
for the Council are concerned, one may note the following: the Community 
procedure would be progressively extended to certain areas in the fields of 
justice and home affairs; all the areas covered by Article K.1 would be put on 
a more solid institutional footing; and the Commission would progressively 
acquire the right of initiative. Subsequently, in specific areas such as asylum 
policy, there would be a gradual transition from intergovernmental cooperation 
to Community responsibility within the Council, thanks to which the Council 
would take its decisions by majority vote pursuant to Article 148 of the Treaty. 
* * * 
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On 4 July 1995 the Federal Presidency of the CDU debated and adopted its 
European policy guidelines for the preparation of the 1996 IGC. These guidelines 
will be submitted for adoption to the CDU Federal Conference in October 1995. 
With respect to the procedure for adopting decisions on matters falling under 
the first pillar, the general rule proposed by the document is that the Council 
should decide by majority vote, except in the areas of taxation, finance, 
enlargement and amendment of the Treaties, where decision by unanimous vote 
should be retained. 
GREECE 
Document: 1 Towards a citizens 1 Europe - democracy and development 1 : memorandum 
for the 1996 IGC 
With respect to institutional reforms, the Greek Government proposes, as far as 
the Council is concerned: 
there should be closer cooperation between COREPER and the Commission; 
The Council's responsibilities should only be extended in the case of 
creation of new policies. Greece will not accept a UN-type model for the Council 
with a small number of permanent members and rotating membership for the smaller 
countries. It follows that any reform of the Council must not make it possible 
for a group of Member States (be they large or small) to decide for the rest. 
The text states that the Greek Government does not endorse the present system 
of qualified majority voting; it proposes that the 'federal state model' (as 
existing in the US) be adopted instead. It supports the notion of the veto as 
safety-valve, as opposed to an opt-out facility for important decisions. 
On the subject of the common foreign and security policy and in the 
. institutional sphere, the document proposes that the Commission should exercise 
a greater planning role; the promotion of Community action should be the 
responsibility of the European Council and the Commission, subject to the 
financial and political control of Parliament and subsequent control by the 
Council. With such a reform of the CFSP, unanimity would be required for 
decisions on policies and joint actions, with due regard for the vital interests 
of the Member States. 
With regard to the third pillar and as far as Articles K.1 and K.3 of the Treaty 
of Maastricht are concerned, the document calls on the Council to explain its 
positions more clearly. 
Conclusions of the interministerial committee of the Greek Government 
(Athens, 7 June 1995) 
According to these conclusions, the Greek positions are: 
at the institutional level, the fundamental Greek position is that of equal 
participation of all Member States in the EU institutions. Greece rejects the 
notion of a multiple-speed Europe. At this level, it is also self-evident that 
the Intergovernmental Conference will function, by definition, on the basis of 
the principle of unanimity (consensus); 
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in the long term, the strengthening of the CFSP is an indispensable condition 
for Europe's existence and survival. In this context, when the issues at stake 
concern vital national interests of the Member States. the rule of unanimity 
Cconsensusl cannot be abandoned. 
DocuJDent: 'The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - starting-points for a 
discussion' 
Another of the key aspects of the IGC discussed in the document is institutional 
reform. The main positions expressed on the subject are as follows: 
With respect to the Council, the document anticipates a possible 
strengthening of its powers. 
On the matter of the yoting rules, the first aspect discussed is the 
replacement of unanimity by qualified majority voting. It is already clear that 
Spain believes that in the case of decisions in such areas as the second and 
third pillars, fiscal harmonization, industrial policy, social security and 
social welfare in general, the major networks, the Structural Funds and the 
Cohesion Fund, the quality of public services and the environment, the unanimity 
rule should either be retained or replaced by a requirement involving an 
'extended qualified majority' (or, on a rather less likely hypothesis, by 
excluding the area concerned from the Union's competence, or else by a 
combination of the above options). 
As regards the blocking majority/minority, the document sets out a number of 
alternatives: maintenance of the Ioannina compromise or something similar after 
enlargement; revision of the existing weighting arrangements in such a way that 
two large countries (of which there would be six, including Spain and Poland) 
plus one small or medium-sized country could obtain a blocking minority, by 
awarding such a grouping two extra votes for the purpose; fixing the blocking 
minority at a higher level as a general rule, but exceptionally providing for 
an alternative arrangement entailing a smaller number of votes representing at 
least three Member States with a total population of over 100 m; introducing a 
double voting system (number of votes plus a certain percentage of total 
population, or number of votes plus a minimum number of Member States); or, 
finally, introducing 'sectoral' blocking minorities, i.e. establishing different 
weighting arrangements in accordance with the subjects or policies voted on, 
following the precedents set by Article 28 of the ECSC Treaty or Article 129d 
of the Treaty on European Union. 
The document also considers possible changes in the weighting system, the aim 
being to bring individual Member States' voting weight in Council more into line 
with population. It is argued that the most satisfactory arrangement would be 
to give two extra votes each to Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and, when 
the time comes, Poland, in the context of a future enlarged Union of thirty or 
so members. In addition, reference is made to the double weighting system (votes 
plus population or votes plus number of Member States) as mentioned above, as 
well as the problems raised by 'micro-states'. 
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With respect to the leadership and coordination of the Council and the 
presidency, the document appears to favour a stronger presidency. It summarizes 
a number of formulas which could help give the presidency greater continuity: 
a longer time period; the creation of 'presidential teams', consisting of four 
or five large groupings of Member States representing different 'national 
peculiarities', each corresponding to some 100m inhabitants, which would serve 
for one year or 18 months; a 'troika'-type presidency (consisting of one large 
country and two small or medium-sized countries), with a term of office of at 
least 18 months; an 'elective' presidency, with a term of office of at least one 
year; and a presidency responsible for external representation over a two-and-a-
half-year period (the presidential role would be filled by a 'personality', with 
the presidents of the Council and Commission as vice-presidents). 
Discussion paper of 4 July 1995 on the WEU: contribution to the 1996 IGC 
The document sets out three options. The first of these C 'option A' ) would 
consist of closer cooperation between an autonomous WEU and the EU. Under this 
formula, where defence decisions were adopted the basic rule of consensus would 
be strictly adhered to as at present, for both the CFSP and the WEU. The 
implementation of an EU decision by the WEU would require the full consent of 
all the EU's Member States and all the full members of the WEU. The present 
institutional set-up would be preserved: this would imply retaining the existing 
WEU bodies, on a basis of complete independence from the EU bodies. The WEU's 
Council of Ministers, Permanent Council and Parliamentary Assembly would keep 
their existing roles and responsibilities; however, closer cooperation between 
the two organizations would be embodied at the highest political level by the 
establishment of a WEU summit, which could, if necessary, meet on a successive 
basis with the European Council. 
Under 'Option B', the document sets out three intermediate options aimed at 
securing greater convergence between the EU and the WEU, the main differences 
between them lying in the nature of the legal and/or political commitments which 
would bind the two organizations. These three possibilities, their exact nature 
varying with the type of agreement chosen, are as follows: 
'Option B1' would entail provisions enabling the EU to determine the guidelines 
for WEU actions; to this end, the European Council would be responsible for 
laying down the guidelines for action on defence-related matters. These would 
be directed both to the other EU bodies and to the WEU, as the organization 
having the power to implement the military action required by the relevant 
decisions of the Council of the European Union. 
'Option B2' would.enable the EU to issue instructions to the WEU. For such 
cases, Article J.4(2) of the TEU could be revised to make it clear that the WEU 
should be seen as politically and operationally subordinate to the EU, its main 
role being to implement the EU's decisions. 
'Option B3' would create a legally binding relationship between the EU and the 
WEU. Under this option, the two would still be separate organizations, and the 
(amended) Treaty of Brussels would therefore remain valid. However, the legal 
form of the EU-WEU institutional framework would be altered, as agreements 
between the two would thenceforth be legally binding. This would reinforce the 
role of the WEU as the implementing organ for the EU's decisions. 
'Option C' would involve the assumption by the EU of responsibility for the 
defence of Europe. This new 'European defence and security identity' would have, 
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allowing for the area of the Union's activities in which the collective defence 
commitment was inserted and for the decision-making procedure adopted, a legal 
framework which could take one of three forms, namely: 
Under 'Option C1', the defence of Europe would fall under the second pillar. All 
aspects of defence would be brought under the wing of the CFSP and the main body 
of the TEU, although those Member States which were not in a position to join 
the collective defence agreement would be allowed a defence opt-out. The basic 
rule of consensus would remain, and the organs would be essentially the same as 
those now existing for the CFSP. 
Under 'Option C2', there would be a procedural exception for defence within the 
CFSP. With a view to preserving sovereignty and the rule of consensus with 
respect to European security matters, a 'defence exception' would make it 
possible to go on applying the rules of the existing CFSP. There would be no 
majority voting on defence matters, no powers of codecision for Parliament and 
no exclusive right of initiative for the Commission, whose participation in 
defence matters would not go beyond the limits established by the existing TEU. 
'Option C3' would entail appending a 'defence protocol' to the Treaty on 
European Union. Most of the provisions on the European security identity - those 
in which all Member States could take part - would be included in the main body 
of the new Treaty. A collective defence protocol would also be annexed: this 
would be open to all Union Member States wishing to sign it. 
The options and possibilities set out in the text by the Spanish Presidency 
could be phased in sequentially. as the order employed above starts with those 
reforms requiring the least institutional change. Tbe order would thus be: 
Option A- Option B CB1. B2. B3) -Option C CC3. C1. C2). 
FRANCE 
The French Government has still not made any official submission on the IGC. 
During the presidential election campaign, President Chirac made a number of 
concrete proposals. He advocated the strengthening of the role of the Council 
and a longer term for the Council presidency, which would endow it with the 
duration required for any large-scale action while backing it up with two vice-
presidencies. He also considered that the Council's powers of proposal should 
be strengthened, as opposed to the almost exclusive powers currently wielded by 
the Commission in this area, and favoured revision of the existing weighting 
arrangements for votes in Council to take greater account of political 
realities. On the voting system, his position was that the various parameters, 
including population, should be linked up in such a way as to create a more 
effective decision-making system: this would not be an obstacle to the principle 
of mutual loyalty among Member States, but should dissuade the Union from 
imposing a decision on a Member State running contrary to the latter's vital 
interests. 
On the occasion of his first general policy statement to the National Assembly 
on 23 May 1995, the new Prime Minister, Mr Juppe referred to his government's 
position on the IGC. He announced that France was ready to submit proposals on 
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the strengthening of the Council and its presidency, the rationalization of the 
decision-making process, the clarification of relations with the Commission and 
the enhancement of democratic control via greater participation by the national 
parliaments. He also said that the IGC should seek to resolve the question of 
the future relations between the Council and an independent central bank, given 
that the latter would be responsible for economic policy. 
The Minister for European Affairs, Mr Barnier, has expressed his support for the 
retention of unanimous voting in a certain number of key areas, including 
foreign policy, defence and security, while conceding that greater flexibility 
could be introduced in this connection to enable certain Member States to go 
further in relations among themselves without being prevented from so doing by 
the rest. 
In an interview with the daily newspaper 'Le Figaro' on 10 July 1995, Mr 
Barnier, who is also France's representative on the Reflection Group, reiterated 
his support for keeping unanimous voting and the intergovernmental approach on 
CFSP matters, and proposed the strengthening of the Council secretariat. 
IRELAND 
At a seminar held at Limerick University on 27 March 1995, the Foreign Minister, 
Dick Spring, made a number of comments on Ireland's likely attitude at the IGC. 
With regard to institutional reform, he stressed that Ireland was anxious to 
preserve the balance among the Member States as far as the weighting of votes 
in Council was concerned. 
Since then, two important speeches further specifying the Irish position on the 
IGC, by Mr Spring on 22 May 1995 and by the Secretary of State for European 
Affairs and member of the Reflection Group, Gay Mitchell, on 6 June 1995, have 
given to understand, with respect to the Council: 
that Ireland supports greater use of qualified majority voting in Council, 
while feeling that a requirement of unanimity could be counter-productive in 
certain areas of particular national sensitivity; 
that, while welcoming any proposals that are likely to improve the Council's 
efficiency, the Irish Government is not convinced of the case for changing the 
existing system of weighted voting: it feels the distinction between 'larger' 
and 'smaller' Member States to be irrelevant, arguing that in reality the 
outcome of voting depends less on the respective sizes of the Member States than 
on the nature of the issues discussed. 
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ITALY 
Statement of 23 February 1995 by the Italian Governaent on foreign policy 
guidelines 
As regards the institutional aspects, the document of the Italian Government 
takes the following positions: 
the weighting of votes needs to be changed and majority voting made the 
general rule in Council. The presidency should be strengthened in order to make 
the Union more visible at the external level and more effective at the internal 
level; 
the Italian Government warns against any attempt by particular Member States 
to set up 'steering committees'; 
as regards the second pillar, the document rejects the idea that there is no 
need to go beyond the intergovernmental level for the time being, maintaining 
instead that the CFSP needs to be strengthened and given a strong identity of 
its own. It proposes that the CFSP Secretariat be equipped with the resources 
required to improve its capacity for analysis and forecasting, and encouraged 
to embark on specific steps and ventures in agreement with the Council and 
Commission and in keeping with the wishes of the Union presidency. 
Statement of 23 May 1995 by the Italian Government on the Intergovernmental 
Conference for the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht 
The Italian Government proposes a drastic reduction in the number of Council 
decisions adopted by consensus. It also favours an extension of majority yoting, 
with greater weight being placed on Member States' populations in the voting 
procedures. 
Accordingly, the text favours the introduction of a double majority (votes plus 
population), to prevent decisions being imposed against the wishes of a majority 
of the Union's citizens. 
The Italian Government considers that a genuine Union external policy will 
require a consensus among the Member States on certain principles and components 
of that policy, amounting to a 'foreign policy agenda' agreed by the Council and 
Parliament. 
It is also felt that the Union's foreign ministers could more frequently decide 
by majority yote, with unanimity being reserved for areas more strictly bound 
up with national interests, such as defence. It is suggested that more flexible 
formulas could be devised to enable actions to be carried out by a limited 
number of Member States, in a context of cooperation and solidarity. 
The Italian Government considers it essential that there should be a permanent 
body with powers of external representation in the field of the Union's external 
policy, and that this body should also be endowed with suitable structures and 
functions of discussion, preparation, proposal and implementation of Council 
decisions. Should this principle be accepted, the Italian Government proposes 
that a Secretary-General be appointed by the Council and, possibly, confirmed 
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by Parliament: this person would be responsible for presenting a recognizable 
image of the Union and stamping its actions with enhanced continuity, 
credibility, responsibility, legitimacy and transparency, thus also superseding 
the limits of the system of rotating presidencies. As an alternative, the 
Italian Government suggests that there could be an elected presidency, serving 
for a two- or three-year term, again on a basis of appointment by the Council 
and confirmation by Parliament; it recognizes, however, that there would be 
problems of coexistence between an elected presidency and the existing system 
of rotating presidencies, let alone the numerous Council meetings, committee 
meetings and working parties. It is therefore further suggested that the 
external policy function be separated off from the other responsibilities of the 
presidency: in this case, the elected President would chair the General Affairs 
Council, and would be assisted by a vice-president, who would be replaced every 
six months in accordance with the existing rotation system, and would be from 
the Member State currently chairing the rest of the Council's business. 
Joint declaration of 15 July 1995 by the German and Italian Foreign Ministers 
on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
This declaration proposes, in the context of the IGC and with a view to 
improving efficiency and raising the level of the CFSP, that the Union's 
capacity for decision and action should be strengthened by the use of majority 
voting in certain fields. It also advocates closer institutional ties between 
the EU and the WEU, with the latter being placed under the authority of the 
European Council. The long-term objective would be the integration of the WEU 
into the EU. 
With regard to justice and home affairs, the text proposes greater use of the 
Community procedures, especially for asylum policy, visa policy and immigration. 
I LUXEMBOURG 
'Memorandum/Handbook' of the Luxembourg Government of 30 June 1995 on the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
On the second pillar and the question of decision-making, the Luxembourg 
Government proposes extending the scope of majority voting. For decisions on 
positions and joint actions, it considers that the principle of 'unanimity minus 
one' would represent a significant advance, since it would allow a Member State 
to dissociate itself from a joint action without stopping it from going ahead. 
The Luxembourg Government considers that there should be a single institutional 
framework for the various pillars. 
The text also examines institutional matters and enlargement; as far as the 
Council is concerned, it calls for an extension of qualified majority voting. 
It is felt, nonetheless, that unanimity should be retained for all subjects 
closely affecting the sovereignty of the Member States and, therefore, of their 
national parliaments (e.g. revision of the Treaties, European citizenship, new 
accessions, taxation and own resources). 
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On the subject of the Council presidency, the Luxembourg Government proposes 
retaining the six-month rotating presidency, and says that it will accept no 
watering-down of this principle. 
NETHERLANDS 
Memorandum on • the enlargement of the European Union: the opportunities and 
obstacles' 
The document examines the institutional questions resulting from enlargement. 
The Dutch Government is against the idea of merely extrapolating the present 
institutional framework when the enlargement negotiations begin. 
Memorandum of the Dutch Government on the common foreign and security policy: 
• towards firmer external action by the Union • 
The third section of this memorandum is taken up by an assessment of the CFSP 
and a number of suggestions concerning its workings. 
With regard to the decision-making system in itself, the document proposes a 
number of alternatives to the rule of consensus. Concerning decisions on 
implementing a joint action, it suggests improving the existing wording of 
Article J.3(2) so as to ensure that all decisions thereunder are adopted by 
qualified majority vote. It also proposes more frequent recourse to abstention 
when a joint action is adopted; in this case, it is suggested that less use 
should be made of the existing system of consensus and that a 'consensus minus 
one' arrangement should be introduced and become the norm, except where a vital 
interest of a Member State is affected. In the latter case, the rule of 
consensus would continue to apply. 
The text also comments on the German proposal that majority voting be introduced 
for the adoption of joint actions. The Dutch Government supports this proposal, 
on the grounds that it would make the CFSP more effective by applying a more 
Community-oriented approach. It points out, however, that the result would be 
a majority-based decision-making system operating within an intergovernmental 
context, in other words a different arrangement from the majority-based 
decision-making system operating in the Community proper, which is characterized 
by the Commission's exclusive right of initiative, the involvement of Parliament 
and the role of the Court of Justice vis-a-vis revision of the legislation 
adopted. 
The Dutch document considers that the 'communitarization' of the CFSP could be 
a longer-term objective. However, after stressing that the options put forward 
for the adoption of joint actions could also be suitable for the process of 
adopting common positions under Article J.2, the Dutch Government concludes that 
the rule of consensus should under no circumstances lead to a situation where 
Member States were forced to send troops for crisis management purposes in the 
context of any future EU defence policy. 
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European cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs - third 
memorandum for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
In particular, the memorandum includes a certain number of intermediate options 
for improving JHA cooperation. Some of these measures could be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Improvements in political guidance, and multi-annual work programmes 
The Dutch Government believes that a multi-annual work programme would help to 
promote the progress and the continuity of cooperation in the fields of justice 
and home affairs. Such a programme would be even more effective if its main 
points were laid down by the European Council. The JHA Council could then 
interpret and elaborate those points. 
2) Streamlining decision-making 
The Dutch Government takes the view that the decision-making structure would be 
streamlined. This would make it easier for the K. 4 Committee to play the 
coordinating role assigned to it under the Treaty on European Union. In 
conjunction with a multi-annual work programme consideration could then be given 
to projects for which the K.4 Committee would be responsible. No amendment to 
the Treaty would be required for this purpose. 
Fourth memorandum of the Dutch Government: the institutional reform of the Union 
With respect to the Council, the document considers that four aspects must be 
examined, namely: the decision-making system; the weighting of votes; the 
presidency; and the Council's working methods. 
On the matter of the Council's decision-making system, the document refers the 
reader to the Dutch Government second and third memorandums concerning the 
second and third pillars. For the first pillar, it proposes that Council 
decisions should in principle be made by qualified majority vote, but that the 
rule of unanimity should continue to apply to tax matters, decisions on own 
resources and constitutional decisions relating to the reform of the Treaties, 
the language regime and accession. 
With regard to the weighting of votes, the Dutch Government considers that there 
should be a reasonable balance between large, medium-sized and small Member 
States. It raises two possibilities: giving more votes to the larger Member 
States, and introducing a 'double-key' system (the existing weighting plus 
representation of a certain percentage- in principle 50% -of the Union's total 
population), and comes down in favour of the second option, on the grounds that 
it would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making system. It 
also implies that the Netherlands will oppose continuation of the Ioannina 
Agreement. 
On the subject of the Council Presidency, the Dutch Government examines four 
possibilities: an annual presidency; a split between the internal and external 
aspects of the presidency; an elected presidency; and an appointed presidential 
team. It provisionally comes down in favour of the last-named option. Such a 
team would consist of a 'troika' of Member States, with one President and two 
vice-presidents, and would serve for one year. 
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Finally, with respect to the Council's working meth9ds, the Dutch Government 
urges the IGC to devise new formulas and calls on the Reflection Group to 
examine the matter and submit proposals for improvement which would not require 
amendment of the Treaties. 
AUSTRIA 
Guidelines proposed by the Austrian Govemllent on the probable subjects of the 
1996 IGC 
In particular, on the subject of the institutional prov1s1ons relating to the 
role of the Council, the Austrian Government is against any reduction in the 
blocking minority. 
It calls for a partial, article-by-article revision to permit the extension of 
qualified maiority voting in Council. 
With respect to the presi4ency, the Austrian Government favours retaining the 
existing rotation system. 
On the matter of the ~ and the role of the presidency, Austria accepts the 
primacy of the Council presidency, and sees no reason for change. Concerning the 
decision-making aspects, the Austrian Government says that it is open to all 
suggestions on judicious means of moving towards majority voting. This could be: 
graduated (for joint actions); or 
sectoral (decisions taken on the basis of 'unanimity minus one'; 'positive 
abstention'; cases of vital national interest would be excepted). 
Unanimity is favoured for the military security aspects of the CFSP. 
On cooperation in the field of home affairs and justice, the Austrian Government 
advocates· the clarification and 'simplification' of working structures, and 
proposes that at least one working layer be removed from the third pillar. To 
this end, it proposes: 
Option A: abolition of the 'steering groups'; 
Option B: merger of the K.4 committee with COREPER, leading to the creation 
of a 'COREPER III'. 
PORTUGAL 
The Portuguese government has not yet published any official document reflecting 
its views regarding the Intergovernmental Conference. More recently, in an 
interview published in the daily newspaper 'PUblico' on 4 June 1995, the Prime 
Minister, Mr Anibal Cavaco Silva, expressed a number of positions concerning the 
Portuguese view on the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
As far as institutional matters are concerned, Portugal will advocate a single 
institutional framework for all areas of the Community's activities and, 
specifically, for the three EU pillars. 
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On the subject of the Council, Mr Cavaco Silva considered that its effectiveness 
should be reinforced by greater use of majority voting; unanimity would remain 
for defence, cultural matters, own resources and reform of the Treaties. 
With respect to the weighting of votes, he felt that the existing system should 
be retained, and ruled out any amendment of the existing Treaty provisions, on 
the grounds that the concept 'state' is not a purely economic and demographic 
matter. 
He also considered that no Member State should be excluded from the rotating 
presidency of the Council. 
The Prime Minister took the view that the institutional balance should be 
preserved, as should the principle of the equality of all Member States in the 
institutions. He therefore considered that Portugal's participation in all the 
Union's institutions and bodies was not a matter for negotiation. 
He felt that the CFSP should be endowed with greater consistency and firmness, 
and that there should be a decided move towards majority voting for the adoption 
of joint actions now requiring unanimity. On the third pillar, he said that he 
would accept qualified majority voting in certain cases. 
Report by the Finnish Government to the Finnish Parliament on the guidelines for 
Finland's European policy - 14 February 1995 
In the institutional field, Finland wishes the Union to remain an association 
of independent Member States. On Community matters, it accordingly advocates 
retaining the existing system under which the Council decides on proposals from 
the Commission. 
With respect to the second and third pillars (CFSP and CHAJ), Finland considers 
that intergovernmental cooperation should remain the main formula for action. 
Nonetheless, it is willing to grant the Union supplementary powers and to 
contribute to improving the Community decision-making system (especially in the 
environmental field), while safeguarding the position of the smaller Member 
States at all stages. 
Programme of the government of the Prime Minister. Paavo Lipponen 
In the institutional field, the new government has declared its willingness to 
work for greater transparency, more extensive publicization and an improved 
decision-making system in the EU. 
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SWEDEN 
In statements to the press, the Swedish Minister for European Affairs, Mr 
Hellstrom, has said that Sweden is not likely to state its position on the 
subjects of the IGC until late 1995. The Swedish Government has not submitted 
any official document to date. 
The Government has, however, declared that it considers the principle of 
transparency to be as vital at Union level as it is in Sweden itself. It 
considers that this principle should be extended to the Council, which can only 




The UK governaent • s aeaorandua of 2 March 1995 on the treataent of European 
defence issues at the 1996 Intergovernmental conference 
This document comes out in favour of establishing a more clear and efficient 
decision-making mechanism. It is argued that security decisions should be taken 
exclusively at intergovernmental level by means of consensus between sovereign 
governments, with no participation bv the European Parliament or the Commission. 
The text also proposes the creation of a new WEU organ at the level of heads of 
state and government (the 'WEU summit'), which would bring together the WEU's 
member states, the countries associated with it and the countries having 
observer status. This organ would be responsible for all military and defence 
policy decisions at European level, and would, if necessary, meet jointly with 
the European Council to ensure coordination between the EU and the WEU. The 
rights and responsibilities of the nations represented at the summit would be 
the same as those currently applying to the WEU Council. However, only full 
members of the WEU would be able to oblige the WEU to act. The 'other' members 
could have the right to participate in certain operations; such participation 
would not affect their status within the organization. 
In the political sphere, mention should be made of the speech made by the Prime 
Minister, John Major, to the Royal Institute for International Relations in 
Brussels, on 30 January 1995. In this speech, he advocated a reform of the 
voting svstem and the operations of the Council, to bring representation of the 
Member States more in line with their contributions and populations, and a 
review and overhaul of the European institutions. He also called for the 
democratic authority of the Council to be strengthened, seeing it as the voice 
of the various nation-states. 
On 22 June 1995, Mr Douglas Hurd, who was then still Foreign Secretary, speaking 
to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, outlined some of 
the proposals to be submitted to the IGC by the UK, including the reform of the 
'troika' system such that, under the rotation arrangement, a smaller Member 
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States would share its six-month term with a larger Member State, and a revised 
system of weighting of votes which would give more importance to the larger 
Member States. 
4. POSITION OF THE COMMISSION 
In the first part of its report of 10 May 1995 on the operation of the Treaty 
on European Union, the Commission, in the context of discussing institutional 
means of fulfilling the criterion of greater legitimacy, makes the following 
points concerning the European Council and the Council: 
The Commission notes, in relation to the European Council, that the TEU has 
strengthened and institutionalized the existing practices, bringing them into 
the forefront of the Union's affairs; the institution's dynamizing role has been 
confirmed by recent practice, which has established it as the focus of 
convergence of the Union's internal and external strategies. In the context of 
EMU, its role has been to debate the broad lines of economic policy, and the 
transition to the third stage will be decided by qualified majority vote by the 
heads of state and government meeting in Council. 
With respect to the Council, the Commission notes that the Treaty gives it the 
main decision-making power in the areas of the CFSP and cooperation in home 
affairs and justice, and that the Council's function remains vi tal in the 
Community decision-making process. 
The Commission endorses the overall institutional response to the criterion of 
legitimacy contained in the treaty, but nonetheless expresses its reservations 
concerning the weakness, if not actual absence, of democratic control in the 
Union in the areas where the intergovernmental approach remains dominant. 
The Commission also refers to the voting procedure in Council in relation to the 
new decision-making rules. It feels there is no doubt that the qualified 
majority voting in Council makes for efficient decision-making. However, it also 
notes that, despite the successive extensions of the field of application of the 
system by the Single European Act and the TEU itself, unanimity is still 
mandatory in numerous areas of the Treaty. 
With respect to the organization of the Council in the area of justice and home 
affairs, the Commission notes that: 
the unanimity requirement has tended to block business, both because it makes 
action and decision more difficult and because it tends to reduce the quality 
of decisions. The Commission concludes that the unanimity requirement is the 
main factor reducing the effectiveness of Title VI. It also notes that the 
Treaty provision that conventions establishing implementing measures may be 
drawn up and subsequently adopted by a two-thirds majority in Council (Article 
K.3) has not been applied; 
on the subject of the means utilized, although since the entry into force of 
the Treaty the power of initiative has theoretically been shared by the 
presidency, individual Member States and the Commission, in practice the texts 
are submitted and the initiatives taken by the Council presidency, as before; 
concerning the working structures in the area in question, which are arranged 
in terms of five levels of negotiation (the Council, COREPER, the K.4 Committee, 
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the 'steering groups' and the working parties), there is considerable 
duplication (of technical responsibilities between the steering groups and the 
working parties, and of arbitration responsibilities between the K.4 Committee 
and COREPER). The Commission considers it obvious that this multi-level 
structure is not the ideal one for achieving compromises as required, and all 
too often leads to matters being referred back to a higher level. 
On the subject of the organization of the Council in the area of the CFSP, the 
Commission examines the deCision-making aspect and concludes that: 
the practice of unanimous voting partly explains the fact that, allowing for 
the diversity of their characteristics, the joint actions undertaken to date 
have narrowed in scope between the mandate of the European Council and their 
actual implementation; 
the Member States are not fully applying the Treaty in the area of procedure. 
In addition to the provision allowing for qualified majority voting in certain 
circumstances (Article J.3(2)), the Member States agreed in Declaration 27 that 
they would, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where 
a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision; 
one of the problems of the CFSP, and one of the causes of its relative lack 
of effectiveness, is the practice of unanimous yoting, even in those cases where 
the Treaty permits qualified majority voting. 
. 
Finally, among its general conclusions, the Commission identifies as actual 
structural deficiencies in the TEU, which a fortiori affect the Council, the 
following features: the multiplicity of procedures of whatever type; the 
structural complexity involved; the decision-making systems; and the lack of 
transparency. The Commission feels with respect to the third pillar that neither 
the legal instruments provided for nor the operating structures chosen permit 
an adequate response to the pressing need for coordination in this field. 
S- ..POSIT.ION OF THE COUNCIL 
In its report of April 1995 on the workings of the Treaty on European Union, the 
Council notes as a starting-point that the European Council should be considered 
a key part of the Union's institutional system, and that the TEU has given an 
impetus to its functions of political dynamization and synthesis. 
The Council also feels that it itself contributes to respect for the democratic 
functioning of the system, since all its members are politically responsible to 
their national parliaments for the positions adopted by them on Union matters. 
On the voting system, the Council considers that: 
the option of qualified maiority voting tends to speedup the decision-making 
process, since it helps avoid blockages; the prospect of being in the minority 
also frequently helps encourage compromises; 
it follows that this efficiency factor is not fully taken into account in 
relation to the fairly limited number of cases for which qualified majority 
voting is permitted. 
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The Council is, in general, satisfied with the workings to date of the 
codecision procedure introduced by the TEU. More generally, it feels that the 
preservation of the efficiency and coherence of its actions will require firmer 
controls on the increase in the number of meetings, as well as suitable 
coordination between the different Councils. 
The Council's text also contains some interesting comments on its own 
organization in the area of the CFSP: 
with respect to the conception and formulation of foreign policy, the Council 
notes that neither it itself nor its Secretary-General has the necessary degree 
of direct access to information; it considers that the Political Committee has 
an essential role to play here; 
on the subject of preparation of decisions, it stresses various factors, 
including the role of COREPER, the merger of the working parties, the key role 
of the CFSP advisers, the general coordination work of the Council Secretariat 
under the presidency, and the use of the 'COREU' procedure, and notes that 
unanimity has been the norm; 
with regard to the implementation of the CFSP, the Council considers that the 
presidency's responsibilities are increasing all the time, thus creating 
problems which have made it necessary to spell out the respective roles of the 
presidency-cum-troika, on the one hand, and the Council Secretariat, on the 
other, in relation to both the administration of the CFSP and the role of the 
Commission; 
concerning the monitoring of the CFSP, the Council feels that the existing 
system should be improved: better use should be made of the Council Secretariat, 
without prejudice to the powers of the presidency and the Commission; 
finally, on the subject of security and defence, the Council confines itself 
to noting that the relations between the Council Secretariat and its WEU 
equivalent are still under discussion. 
With respect to the organization of the Council in the field of justice and home 
affairs, the Council notes that: 
no use has been made of the option of qualified majority voting permitted by 
the Treaty; 
the multi-level structure (the Council, COREPER, the K.4 Committee, the 
'steering groups' and the working parties) has proved to be cumbersome and has 
slowed down decision-making. The Council feels that there is a need to 
re-examine the role of the steering groups and the working parties assisting the 
K.4 Committee, and that that committee is at times finding it difficult to 
fulfil its role under the Treaty. 
6. POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
In its resolution of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European 
Union with a view to the 1996 intergovernmental conference - implementation and 
development of the Union, Parliament expresses the following positions: 
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the principle of transparency should be explicitly spelt out in the Treaty, 
and detailed mechanisms should be established for its application; 
the existing system of six-month presidencies of the Council and European 
Council should be retained, although its workings should be made more flexible; 
if the Union is to function effectively, there must be an extension of 
qualified majority voting; at all events, the threshold for a qualified majority 
must be reduced from its present excessively high level of 71%; 
for certain particularly delicate areas (amendment of the Treaty, Article 235 
and 'constitutional decisions' ; enlargement; own resources; the single electoral 
procedure), unanimity should remain; 
the voting system in Council may be in need of reform, but not on the basis 
of a 'double majority' of Member States and population, because it is Parliament 
that represents the population while the Council represents the Member States; 
a weighting system designed to reflect the overall importance of Member 
States should not be based exclusively or proportionally on population. 
On the CFSP, the main points of present interest in Parliament's text are: 
the possibility of a number of Member States undertaking, on the basis of a 
qualified majority vote, a humanitarian, diplomatic or military action as a 
'joint action', provided that no Member State is either forced to take part 
against its will or allowed to stop the majority of Member States from carrying 
the action out; 
there should be a joint Commission and Council planning and analysis unit, 
to be responsible for helping in the conception and formulation of EU policies. 
In the field of cooperation in justice and home affairs, Parliament calls for 
the introduction of qualified majority voting in Council, and believes that the 
legislative authority should be enabled to adopt directives without a unanimity 
requirement. 
7. POSITION OF THE OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES 
7.1. OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The report of the Court of Justice of May 1995 on certain aspects of the 
implementation of the Treaty on European Union concerns only those aspects 
relating to or likely to affect the Union's legal system. With respect to the 
Council, it refers to the following aspects: 
the Council's use of the facility of taking out annulment proceedings against 
acts of the European Parliament liable to have legal effects in relation to 
third parties (this facility is offered by the new wording of the first 
paragraph of Article 173); 
the desirability of changing the requirement of unanimous approval by the 
Council for any amendment of the Court's rules of procedure: either the Court 
could be allowed to adopt the text itself directly, or any changes would be 
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considered to be permanent if the Council failed to amend the Court's proposal 
within a certain time; 
on the possibility of appealing to the Council following the institution of 
a dual judicial system, the Court stresses that preliminary rulings are not 
sui ted to a system of dual jurisdiction, in view of the need to avoid 
unacceptable procedural delays and to ensure that there is no 'problem of 
authority' in respect of first-instance judgments. 
The contribution of the Court of First Instance with a view to the 1996 IGC does 
not contain any particular institutional comments worth noting in relation to 
the Council . 
7. 2. OPINION OF THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
The report submitted by the Court of Auditors to the Reflection Group on the 
operation of the Treaty on European Union in May 1995 does not contain any 
specific institutional comments of relevance to the Council. 
7. 3. OPINION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
The ESC's opinion of 26 April 1995 on the IGC and the role of the Economic and 
Social Committee defines the broad objectives of the IGC as being: 
the democratic reform of the existing institutions; 
the 'communitarization' of the third pillar; 
the creation of greater coherence between trade policy, development 
cooperation policy and the CFSP, on the basis of a single decision-making 
framework and the more effective and speedy implementation of decisions. 
There is no other significant reference to the institutional arrangements 
relating specifically to the Council. 
7. 4. OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
In its opinion on the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht (20 April 1995), the 
Committee of the Regions announced that it would begin work in July 1995 on a 
text on the conditions for a positive dynamic in relation to the EP and the 
other institutions. 
This document contains proposals for rev1s1ng the Treaty in the areas of the 
principle of subsidiarity, the system of appeals to the Court of Justice and the 
Committee of the Regions itself. It does not contain any specific comments on 
institutional questions of relevance to the Council or the European Council. It 
does, however, call for specific action on the 'communitarization' of the third 
pillar, with specific reference to the right to asylum and emigration. 
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8. OTHER POSITIONS 
* PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE REFLECTION GROUP ON THE IGC/1996 
{1 September 1995) 
THE COUNCIL 
A. Basic points 
Agreement on strengthening the role of the Council as an institution with 
clear legislative and executive powers, without prejudice to the 
institutional balance. 
Powers: 
* Maintenance of its present functions, strenghtening its ability to act. 
Decision-taking mechanism: 
* Unanimity of qualified majority ? There is consensus within the Group 
in favour of maintaining unanimity for the amendment of primary 
legislation: Articles N and 0 and other decisions of a "constitutional" 
nature, such as own resources. All of those require ratification by 
national parliaments and in some cases the EP's assent is required as 
well. 
As regards decisions on secondary legislation, a majority maintains that 
the enlarged Union would appear to require the extension or even the 
generalization of the qualified majority, for reasons of efficiency, in 
order to prevent the need to reduce the discrepancy between the 
development achieved in the internal market (where qualified majorities 
are the rule) and the lack of development in accompanying policies in 
the social, tax and environment spheres (where basically unanimity is 
the rule). Some members reject this reasoning while others accept it, 
but see exceptions as warranted in the defence of sensitive interests. 
Some link the move from unanimity to a qualified majority with better 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and sufficient means. 
* Formulas intermediate between unanimity and a qualified majority are 
contemplated for Titles V and VI (a super-qualified majority, positive 
abstention, consensus less one) and for specially sensitive Community 
questions. These possibilities must be studied in greater depth. 
* Weighting of votes for purposes of qualified majorities. Bearing in mind 
that in democratic societies efficiency is inseparable from legitimacy 
and that an efficient decision is not the one that is the easiest to 
adopt but the one that receives the most support from citizens, some 
members point to the growing imbalance between the population and its 
representation in votes by qualified majority, the procedure by which 
most Community decisions affecting citizens directly are taken. In the 
view of those members, the next enlargement would create a situation in 
which, if that imbalance is not corrected, a qualified majority could 
be achieved with a number of votes that could even represent a minority 
of the population. Those members consider that such a situation 
undermines the efficiency and democracy of Council decisions and is 
unacceptable in the context of future enlargement. In their view, the 
DOC_EN\DV\280\280115 - 27 - Or. ES 
system should be corrected so that greater account is taken of 
population by means of new weight ins for votes, a change in the 
threshold for qualified majorities or the introduction of a double 
threshold (votes and population). Other members, on the other hand, do 
not endorse that analysis but rather insist that the weighting of votes 
in the Council must be based more on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of States than on the population factor, which they feel is 
already adquately reflected in each State's representation in the 
European Parliament·:· They also point out that this is a false problem, 
since practice shows that in the Community there is no systematic 
pattern of small-population countries forming coalitions against the 
large-population countries, and accordingly they do not consider it 
necessary to alter the present system. 
* The organization of Councils and their methods of work: Regardless of 
the growing imbalance that some allege in the efficiency and legitimacy 
of the voting system, a large majority recognizes a gradual decline both 
in the organization and in the methods of work of Councils, which 
conceived for a smaller number of Member States. The Group stresses the 
need for the General Affairs Council to re-assume its role of the 
general coordination of Union affairs and ensure that the institution's 
activities are consistent overall. In the preparatory phase of 
decisions, a majority of members see a need for greater consistency 
between preparatory committees. For some members of the Group the 
enlargement of the Union means that reconsideration of the Council's 
working methods can no longer be postponed, some phases of working group 
discussion being dropped in favour of a written procedure, on the basis 
of arrangements that will have to be studied in depth. 
* Publicity: For some representatives, the Council should be open to the 
public whenever it works as a legislative chamber. Others, on the 
contrary, point out that an excess of transparency can be harmful to 
efficiency. For theses members, more than trying to diferentiate between 
the executive and the legislative functions, the prevailing question is 
the intensive and constant negotiation task, which should not be public. 
Other members, finally, specify that publicity (not so much by the 
broadcasting of the debates as simply by setting up some listening rooms 
open to interested media) could be restricted to the initial debate of 
presentation of a legislative proposal and to the final moment of 
voting. It would be desirable to explore whether this last idea deserves 
the support of the Group. 
* Presidency: The Group stressed the importance of Presidency's role in 
that it was responsible for conducting the Union's affairs. The Group 
sets great store by the feeling of belonging that is encouraged by the 
system of rotating Presidencies and by the will to do better and the 
stimulation of those holding the office. The prospective enlargement 
would result in each country's turn coming round much less frequently, 
making it necessary to establish a system which will ensure greater 
permanence and visibility for the Presidency without making more 
sporadic the participation by Member States in an enlarged Union. To 
achieve that the Group has been looking at various arrangements that 
combine elements of permanence and rotation, such as Presidency by 
teams. It is also considering the possibility of electing a President 
or a High Representative of the Union for external policy matters. The 
DOC_EN\DV\280\280115 
- 28 - Or. ES 
Group will have to study these questions with a view to ensuring the 
general consistency of institutional functioning. 
B. Areas for reflection 
Maintenance of unanimity: In which cases ? Should the EP participate when the 
Council decides unanimously ? Under which principles ? In which cases ? 
Scope of qualified majority: Generalized for secondary Community legislation 
? Should it be accompanied by co-decision with the EP for legislative 
decisions ? Is a cases-by-case approach preferable at the present stage of 
integration and with the prospect of enlargement ? 
Weighting of the qualified majority: How can an adequate balance of 
population and votes be ensured in a fashion acceptable to all ? 
Organization of the Council: How can the central role of the General Affairs 
Council be restored ? Creation of a Council of European Affairs composed of 
deputies to the General Affairs Council, with frequent meetings, so that the 
General Affairs Council of full members receives a reduced agenda which will 
enable them to deliberate and decide on Union affairs ? 
The Council's methods of work: Study the possibility of applying written 
procedures in the preparatory phases; study arrangements increasing Permanent 
Representatives Committee/Political Committee consistency. 
Publicity: Can the Group accept the opening to the public of the Council in 
the initial and final phase of the legislative process ? 
Study options for exercising the Presidency that solve its operating 
requirements in an enlarged Union. 
* * * * * 
For further information related to this briefing, please contact: 
J. Javier FERNANDEZ FERNANDEZ, Task Force Secretariat, Division for Political 
and Institutional Affairs (DG IV): 
Tel.: 2758 (Luxembourg), 4916 (Strasbourg); 
Fax: 4300-9027 (Luxembourg), 88174840 (Strasbourg). 
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